Science and Values

Laudan constructs a fresh approach to a longtime problem for the philosopher of science: how to explain the simultaneous and widespread presence of both agreement and disagreement in science. Laudan critiques the logical empiricists and the post-positivists as he stresses the need for centrality and values and the interdependence of values, methods, and facts as prerequisites to solving the problems of consensus and dissent in science.

Acknowledgments 
Preface 
One 
Two Puzzles about Science: Reflections on Some Crises in Philosophy and Sociology of Science 
The Consensual View and the Puzzle of Agreement 
The "New Wave" Preoccupation with Dissensus 
Two 
The Hierarchical Structure of Scientific Debates 
Factual Consensus Formation 
Methodological Consensus Formation 
Three 
Closing the Evaluative Circle: Resolving Disagreements about Cognitive Values 
The Covariance Fallacy 
The Reticulated Model and the Mechanics of Goal Evaluation 
The Reticulated Model of Scientific Rationality 
Four 
Dissecting the Holist Picture of Scientific Change 
Kuhn on the Units of Scientific Change
Kuhn's Critique of Methodology
Five 
A Reticulational Critique of Realist Axiology
and Methodology
Epilogue
References
Index