The Case for Animal Rights

More than twenty years after its original publication, The Case for Animal Rights is an acknowledged classic of moral philosophy, and its author Tom Regan is recognized as the intellectual leader of the animal rights movement. In a new and fully considered preface, Regan responds to his critics and defends the book's revolutionary position.

Tom Regan is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at North Carolina State University and is the author (with Carl Cohen) of The Animal Rights Debate and Empty Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights.

Preface to the 2004 Edition           
Preface to the First Edition           
Acknowledgments
                      
1. ANIMAL AWARENESS                    
  1.1 Descartes's Denial
  1.2 How Not to Challenge Descartes 
  1.3 The Principle of Parsimony
  1.4 La Mettrie's Objection 
  1.5 The Language Test
  1.6 Skepticism
  1.7 Evolutionary Theory and Consciousness
  1.8 Descartes's Downfall
  1.9 The Cumulative Argument for Animal Consciousness
  1.10 Which Animals are Conscious?
  1.11. Summary and Conclusion

2. THE COMPLEXITY OF ANIMAL AWARENESS 
  2.1 The Belief-Desire Theory
  2.2 Language and Belief
  2.3 The Content of Belief
  2.4 Three Objections
  2.5 The Complexity of Animal Consciousness
  2.6 Summary and Conclusion

3. ANIMAL WELFARE                     
  3.1 The Autonomy of Animals 3.2 Interests 3.3 Benefits 
  3.4 Harms 3.5 Death 3.6 Paternalism and Animals
  3.7 Euthanasia and Animals 3.8 Summary and Conclusion

4. ETHICAL THINKING AND THEORY        
  4.1 Some Ways Not to Answer Moral Questions
  4.2 The Ideal Moral Judgment
   4.3 Criteria for Evaluating Moral Principles
  4.4 Consequentialist Ethical Theories
  4.5 Nonconsequentialist Ethical Theories
  4.6 Evaluating Ethical Theories
  4.7 Summary and Conclusion

5. INDIRECT DUTY VIEWS              
  5.1 Indirect and Direct Duty Views
  5.2 Moral Agents and Moral Patients
  5.3 Narveson's View: Rational Egoism
  5.4 Rawls's Position: Contractarianism
  5.5 Kant's Position: Humanity as End in Itself
  5.6 The Moral Arbitrariness of All Indirect Duty Views
  5.7 Summary and Conclusion

6. DIRECT DUTY VIEWS                
  6.1 The Cruelty-Kindness View
  6.2 Hedonistic Utilitarianism 
  6.3 Preference Utilitarianism
  6.4 Singer's Grounds for Vegetarianism
  6.5 Utilitarianism and Speciesism
  6.6 Summary and Conclusion

7. JUSTICE AND EQUALITY             
  7.1 Utilitarian and Perfectionist Theories of Justice
  7.2 Individuals as Equal in Value
  7.3 "All Animals Are Equal"
  7.4 Inherent Value and Reverence for Life
  7.5 Inherent Value and the Subject-of-a-Life Criterion
  7.6 Justice: The Principle of Respect for Individuals
  7.7 Rule Utilitarianism and Justice
  7.8 Defending the Respect Principle 
  7.9 The Derivation of the Harm Principle
  7.10 Summary and Conclusion

8. THE RIGHTS VIEW                  
  8.1 Moral and Legal Rights
  8.2 Claims and Valid Claims 
  8.3 Acquired and Unacquired Duties
  8.4 The Respect Principle and the Right To Respectful Treatment
  8.5 The Rights of Moral Patients
  8.6 A Miscellany of Objections 
  8.7 Overriding the Right Not to be Harmed
  8.8 The Innocence of Moral Patients 8.9 Should the Numbers Count? 
  8.10 The Miniride and Worse-off Principles
  8.11 Why Side Effects Don't Count
  8.12 More Objections Answered 
  8.13 Unfinished Business
  8.14 Summary and Conclusion

9. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RIGHTS VIEW  
  9.1 Why Vegetarianism is Obligatory
  9.2 Why Hunting and Trapping Are Wrong
  9.3 How to Worry about Endangered Species
 9.4 Against the Use of Animals in Science
 9.5 Summary and Conclusion

Epilogue                
Notes                   
Index