When Governments Collide

When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–1968 by Wallace J. Thies examines one of the most consequential strategic gambles of the Johnson administration: the effort to compel North Vietnam to abandon its support of the insurgency in the South through a carefully calibrated mix of military pressure and diplomatic signaling. Tracing the path from covert operations to the sustained bombing campaign known as Rolling Thunder, Thies shows how U.S. leaders believed that “restrained but rising pressures” could erode Hanoi’s will, create bargaining leverage, and bring the conflict to a negotiated settlement on American terms.

Yet by 1968, after three years of escalating coercion and more than half a million U.S. troops deployed, Washington was no closer to its goals. Thies probes why. He identifies three assumptions that underpinned both policy and theory: that gradual escalation would force compliance; that policymakers could “orchestrate” words and deeds to send clear signals; and that military force could be turned on and off at will. Each proved far less reliable in practice than expected. Situating the Vietnam case within the larger debates over limited war, deterrence, and coercive diplomacy, Thies challenges the confidence of midcentury strategists such as Kaufmann, Brodie, Schelling, and Kahn, who treated governments as if they were unitary, rational actors. Drawing on rich documentary evidence, When Governments Collide not only illuminates the failures of American strategy in Vietnam but also offers a broader reappraisal of the possibilities—and sharp limits—of coercion in international politics.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1980.

When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict 1964–1968 by Wallace J. Thies examines one of the most consequential strategic gambles of the Johnson administration: the effort to compel North Vietnam to abandon its support of the insurgency in the South through a carefully calibrated mix of military pressure and diplomatic signaling. Tracing the path from covert operations to the sustained bombing campaign known as Rolling Thunder Thies shows how U.S. leaders believed that “restrained but rising pressures” could erode Hanoi’s will create bargaining leverage and bring the conflict to a negotiated settlement on American terms.

Yet by 1968 after three years of escalating coercion and more than half a million U.S. troops deployed Washington was no closer to its goals. Thies probes why. He identifies three assumptions that underpinned both policy and theory: that gradual escalation would force compliance; that policymakers could “orchestrate” words and deeds to send clear signals; and that military force could be turned on and off at will. Each proved far less reliable in practice than expected. Situating the Vietnam case within the larger debates over limited war deterrence and coercive diplomacy Thies challenges the confidence of midcentury strategists such as Kaufmann Brodie Schelling and Kahn who treated governments as if they were unitary rational actors. Drawing on rich documentary evidence When Governments Collide not only illuminates the failures of American strategy in Vietnam but also offers a broader reappraisal of the possibilities—and sharp limits—of coercion in international politics.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice reach and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893 Voices Revived makes high-quality peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1980.